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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the different fiduciary duties and standards of review imposed by 
Delaware laws on the directors to the minority shareholders in the going-private transactions 
structured either as a merger or as a tender offer voluntarily initiated by the controlling 
shareholders.  
In the context of a merger, the disinterested and independent directors will face a duty of 
care and be subject to the business judgment rule. For the interested or dependent directors, they 
will bear a duty of loyalty and be bound to the entire fairness standard accordingly.   
In the case of a tender offer, currently the Delaware courts impose no fiduciary duties on 
the directors. This thesis thus makes a proposal to ask for Delaware Court to impose the 
evaluation and recommendation duty on the directors to the minority shareholders as soon as 
possible so as to better protect those shareholders. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
The recent increase in merger and acquisition activities in China has focused more Chinese 
law professionals’ attention on the protection of those involved minority shareholders. As 
corporate directors are viewed as the fiduciaries of the corporation, it seems proper and 
necessary for them to be subject to a pervasive fiduciary duty when they exercise their broad 
powers over corporate property and processes. However, except for few provisions with a simple 
mention on that issue, 1 almost no theories or specified statutes in Chinese corporate law discuss 
the problem.  Contrastingly, in the American corporate setting, the fiduciary duty of directors, 
as a product of case law, has already been developed into a broad body of rules governing 
directors’ pursuit of individual interests at the expense of corporation for which they work.2  
In the United States, due to a substantial uniformity in the so-called common law of 
corporations, courts of one state may borrow freely from the jurisprudence developed by courts 
in other states.3 Because Delaware is the home of more than half of the country’s largest 
                                                  
1
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa (Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of China) art. 59-62, (1999), 
Falv Fagui Huibian (2003).  
2
 William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of 
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] 859, 861 (2001) (“Over the course of the twentieth 
century, the mandatory features of the statutory law gradually decreased. Statutes became increasingly elegant and 
flexible, continuously moving away from a mandatory or prescriptive model and ever closer to a pure contractual or 
enabling model. As a consequence, what emerged as a counterpoint to the evolution of the enabling model of 
corporation law was the second key function of the law of corporations: the ex post judicial review of the actions of 
corporate officers and directors, measured by fiduciary principle. Fiduciary review imported into corporate law the 
centuries-old equity tradition that subjected the conduct of fiduciaries to judicial supervision. The fiduciary duty of 
corporate officers, directors, and controlling shareholders has been a protean concept that has generated much of 
what is novel and interesting in modern corporation law…”). 
3
 Charles R.T. O’Kelley & Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business Associations Cases and 
Materials 141 (4th ed. 2003). 
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corporations,4 the state plays a dominant role in shaping corporate law and represents the 
preeminent American corporate law jurisdiction.5  On the broad issue of fiduciary duties, 
Delaware courts have also developed many judicial rules to define the bounds of directors’ 
potential liability for misconduct in carrying out official duties, many of which are routinely 
cited by courts of other jurisdictions.6 As for the directorial fiduciary duties in the take over 
context specially, the two periods of heightened merger activities in the 1990s 7 pushed 
Delaware Supreme Court to reevaluate its treatment of directorial discretion in that context to 
address more accurately the risks borne by shareholders, especially those stemming from the 
directorial conflicts of interest.8  
The going-private transaction is one type of transactions which frequently involves with 
directorial conflicts of interest. In these transactions, the controlling shareholder, often the 
acquirer, with substantial nonpublic information regarding the company’s operations, generally 
has significant influence over the board of directors.9 The risk that a controlling shareholder will 
                                                  
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. 
6
 See, e.g., Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d at 1536 (affirming district court’s “assumption that Georgia would 
follow Delaware caselaw”); Lady v. Amsterdam, 815 F.2d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1987) (“finding no Pennsylvania case in 
point, the district court predicted that Pennsylvania would follow the law of Delaware”).  
7
 Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder Right under Delaware Law: 
Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and Maximizing Long-term Share Value by Restricting Directorial 
Discretion, 1995 [COLUM. BUS L. REV.] 725, n.1 (“…The first period, led by the Paramount 
Communications/Viacom Corporation merger in 1993, has promulgated a considerable body of case law 
commenting on directors' duty to shareholders. At the time, it was noted that the 1993 merger activity had resulted 
in a ‘banner year for plaintiffs seeking to hold corporate boards accountable. . . .’ (Karen Donovan, Corporate 
Directors Take Beating From Del. Supreme Court, [NAT'L L. J.], Dec. 27, 1993-Jan. 3, 1994, at 17.) The more 
recent period of merger activity has been much more dramatic, but has not yet had time to ripen into judicial 
doctrine. The 1995 has seen an ‘avalanche of merger and acquisition activity, led by the takeover bids for Capital 
Cities-ABC by Walt Disney, for CBS by Westinghouse and, most recently, for Turner Broadcasting by Time 
Warner. . . .’ (David Usborne, View from New York: Wall Street Cashes in on Merger Mania, [THE 
INDEPENDENT], Oct. 2, 1995, at 21). Indeed, with the third quarter of 1995 alone seeing $ 125.2 billion in 
takeovers, 1995 is posturing to be the biggest year for takeovers in history.”). 
 
8
 Id. at 727. 
9
 Kimble Charles Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority Shareholders in the Context of 
Going-Private Transactions: The Case for Obliging Directors to Express a Valuation Opinion in Unilateral Tender 
Offers after Siliconix, Aquila and Pure Resources, 2003 [COLUM. BUS. L. REV.] 191, 194. 
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use this control and information advantage to the detriment of minority shareholders when 
acquiring their shares is rather significant.10 Therefore, compared to a hostile third-party merger 
and acquisition against which the board often takes defensive measures, such going-private 
transactions as those launched by the controlling shareholders on a voluntary basis, should raise 
more concerns of the board as well as the court regarding the protection of the minority 
shareholders. 
Thus, although many going-private transactions have emerged in the response to the hostile 
acquisitions, which have led to a corresponding development of many central concepts to define 
appropriate directorial behavior, including the classic duties of loyalty and due care owned by 
the directors to the company generally and shareholders specially,11 this article will focus on the 
analysis on the directorial fiduciary duties arising from the going-private transactions initiated by 
the controlling shareholders in a voluntary context. It addresses the different fiduciary duties 
undertaken by directors to the minority shareholders in the context of going-private merger 
versus unilateral tender offer under current Delaware laws. First, this article will introduce the 
main forms and corresponding standards of review regarding fiduciary duties. Second, it will 
outline the background, characteristics, and forms of going-private transactions. Third, the article 
will review the fiduciary duties stemming from the going-private mergers structured by the 
controlling shareholders. Fourth, it will examine the directorial duties under a unilateral tender 
offer based on the recent cases in Delaware. After discussion of the differences in these 
directorial duties, this article will propose some changes to the rules governing directorial duties 
to the minority shareholders in a controlling-shareholder initiated unilateral tender offer.  
                                                  
10
 Id. 
11
 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp. (In re 
Unitrin, Inc.), 651 A.2d 1361; Katz v. Chevron Corp. (1994) 22 Cal. App.4th 1352, [27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681]. 
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CHAPTER 2  
FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
A. General Introduction and Historical Background 
As stated over 250 years ago, fiduciary duties were described by the Lord Chancellor in 
Charitable Corp. v. Sutton,12 “by accepting of a trust of this sort, a person is obliged to execute 
it with fidelity and reasonable diligence.”13 In the words of the United States Supreme Court in 
Briggs v. Spaulding,14 the most frequently cited of the early American decisions involving 
fiduciary obligations in the corporate context, directors must act as would “ordinarily prudent 
and diligent men ... under similar circumstances, and in determining that … the usages of 
business should be taken into account.”15 These common-law-based fiduciary obligations form 
the bedrock of the corporate governance law today.  
Within the current governance law, the directorial fiduciary duties are a main part. Because 
the directors are the individuals to charge with the responsibility for managing corporate 
affairs,16 they shall accordingly owe fiduciary duties to the corporation they serve and its 
shareholders.17  
Generally speaking, the directorial fiduciary duty in the corporate setting has two quite 
different functions. First, it instructs directors to be absolutely fair and candid in pursuing 
personal interests. Second, it describes the bounds of acceptable conduct for directors in carrying 
                                                  
12
 2 Atk. 400 (1742). 
13
 Id. at 406. 
14
 141 U.S. 132 (1891). 
15
 Id. at 152; see also Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1919). 
16
 O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 3, at 221 
17
 Dennis H. Block, Nancy E. Barton & Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judgment Rule Fiduciary duties of 
Corporate Directors 1 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995). 
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out their individual and collective duty to manage the corporation.18 Both functions raise a core 
issue—how optimally to reduce the possibility that directors will favor personal interests over 
the corporation’s interests.19 Generally, these fiduciary obligations are distinguished as the duty 
of care and the duty of loyalty. In simplest terms, the duty of care requires that directors exercise 
the care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances, and the 
duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing.20  
In addition to the aforementioned common law development of the principles defining 
fiduciary duties, many states have codified standards to govern the general conduct of 
directors.21  With over forty percent of the corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
and over fifty percent of Fortune 500 companies incorporated in the state,22 the Delaware court 
system, often viewed as “the Mother Court of corporate law,”23 as well as the Delaware state 
legislature again make a great contribution in this aspect.  
 
B. Fiduciary Duties in Delaware 
a. Main Categories of Fiduciary Duties  
Under Delaware, the fiduciary duties imposed on the directors have been divided primarily 
into two categories. The first category involves directors’ duty of care. In effect, prior to the 
                                                  
18
 O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 3, at 221. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 See, e.g., Cal. Gen Corp Law § 309 (a); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717; Va. Stock Corp. Act § 13.1-690; Del. Gen. 
Corp. Law § 141. 
22
 R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, The Delaware Law of Corporations and Business Organizations F-1 
(2nd ed. 1990 & Supp. 1992) 
23
 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990); see also NCR Corp. v. American Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 761 F. Supp.475, 499 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“the decision of Delaware courts are often persuasive in the field 
of corporate law”); Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F.Supp. 103, 147 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Michigan courts look to 
Delaware law as a guide for adjudicating matters involving corporate law”). 
   - 6 - 
1980s, that duty received little or no notice in Delaware.24 Instead, directors were presumed (all 
but conclusively) to have acted as reasonable persons would.25 After 1985, however, with the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s description of the business judgment rule as a “presumption” of 
regularity since 1984,26 the duty of care emerged in Delaware as an independently enforceable 
obligation and has become one of the typical categories of cases with which courts applying 
fiduciary principles must deal.27 
The second category—duty of loyalty is involved in the directors’ malfeasance such as 
self-dealing, executive compensation that exceeds the fair value of the services provided, 
usurpation of a business opportunity that might have benefited the corporation, acceptance of 
bribes in exchange for making certain decisions, and so forth. The duty of loyalty is rigorously 
enforced by requiring the directors to justify any of those acts as intrinsically fair.28 
 
b. To Whom the Directors Owe the Fiduciary Duties  
 The classic approach maintains that the directors owe the fiduciary duties to the corporate 
entity and not to the individual shareholders.29 Nonetheless, the Delaware Supreme Court stated 
in Revlon that the directors owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.30 
The academics’ views on this issue are also divided. Some commentators hold that in some 
special circumstances, the directors shall owe those directorial duties to both the corporation and 
                                                  
24
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 862. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Grover C. Brown, Michael J. Maimone & Joseph C. Schoell, Director and Advisor Disinterestedness and 
Independence under Delaware Law, 23 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] 1157, 1161(1998) (“It is a presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”).   
27
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 862. 
28
 See Alcott v. Hyman, 208 A.2d 501, 507 (Del. 1965); See also Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979). 
29
 See, e.g., O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 3, at 222 (“Normally, directors owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation, not to individual shareholders.”). 
30
 Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, 506 A. 2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986). 
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its shareholders.31 Others though follow the classic approach and still maintain that “there are 
important circumstances in which the managers and corporation owe fiduciary duties directly to 
the corporation’s shareholders.”32  
Since the share, which is the fungible ownership unit of a corporation, entitles the holders to 
a pro rata right to share the corporation’s profits, net assets, and the voting power, the 
shareholders are accordingly equipped with a basic power to elect annually the corporation’s 
directors and approve fundamental changes in the corporation’s governing rules or structure.33 
Thus, under circumstances where the shareholders’ basic rights will be materially affected, it 
seems reasonable to entitle a shareholder to pursue a proper legal remedy for his own interests. 
However, it is through the corporation that the shareholders can enjoy their basic rights and bear 
their investment risks. To that extent, the corporations, in those very circumstances with direct 
impact on shareholders’ basic rights, will perform as a fiduciary of its shareholders and be 
subject to the relevant duties accordingly. Matters such as mergers, dissolution, charter 
amendment, and substantial asset sales of the corporation that generally require the shareholders’ 
prior action or consent probably constitute the important or special circumstances addressed by 
those aforementioned commentators.   
 Since the board of directors is the management body as well as the fiduciary of the 
corporation, the question arises as to whether the directors will automatically owe the fiduciary 
duties directly to the corporate shareholders under the circumstances where the corporation 
undertakes a direct fiduciary duty to its stockholders. This question is left open. However, 
                                                  
31
 See Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 17; See also Robert W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations in a Nutshell, 
303 (1987) (“…with the restriction, that the directors can become directly liable to single shareholders in certain 
circumstances.”) 
32
 See O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 3, at 222.  
33
 Id. at 137. 
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pursuant to the case law and statutory provisions of Delaware, the answer is likely in the 
positive.  
In the merger circumstances, the comment to Delaware General Corporation Law section 251 
states: “Where a cohesive group of stockholders with majority voting power is irrevocably 
committed to the merger transaction, effective representation of the financial interests of the 
minority shareholders imposes upon the board an affirmative responsibility to protect those 
minority shareholders' interests.”34 In Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc.,35 the court held that a 
director may not abdicate his or her fiduciary duty to act in an informed and deliberate manner in 
determining whether to approve an agreement of merger before submitting the proposal to the 
stockholders by leaving the decision to approve or disapprove the agreement to the stockholders 
alone.36 
 In the case of corporate dissolution, as the shareholders are the lawful owners of the 
corporation, and once a decision is made to sell the company, they deserve the primary benefit of 
the exercise of the board’s fiduciary duties.37 In Revlon,38 the Delaware Supreme Court stated 
that once it became “inevitable” that the target company would be sold, the directors of the target 
had a fiduciary duty to do what was best for the shareholders of the target. 39  
                                                  
34
 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8 § 251 Notes (2003). 
35
 532 A.2d 1324 (Del. Ch. 1987). 
36
 Id. at 1339. 
37
 Harvey L. Pitt, On the Precipice: A Reexamination of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Hostile 
Acquisitions, 15 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] 811, 879; See also Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware 
Corporation to Act as An Auctioneer, 44 [BUS. LAW] 275, at 278-79 (1989) (“The directors are responsible only to 
the shareholders when it becomes clear to the directors that the corporation as an effective business entity will not 
survive in recognizable form. From the moment the directors perceive that clarity, their role shifts from beneficent 
fiduciaries for a wide range of constituencies to auctioneers with the solitary goal of achieving the highest price for 
shareholders.”).  
38
 506 A.2d at 182 (Del. 1986). 
39
 Id.; See also In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
P94,181, at 91,641, 91,643 (Del. Ch. 1988) (directors’ duty is to get the highest price at a sale for the benefit of 
shareholders); and Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, No. 10,095, slip op. at 1 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“directors have a fiduciary 
duty to obtain best possible price for stockholders”), reprinted in 14 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] 682, 684 (1989); and 
Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., Inc., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] [FED. SEC. L. REP.] (CCH) P93,502, at 
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In the case of charter amendment and substantial asset sales where the stockholders’ action is 
needed, Delaware certainly has recognized that the directors have a fiduciary duty of disclosure 
to stockholders.40 
 From this discussion, it is apparent that the directors owe the fiduciary duties directly to the 
minority shareholders in some important contexts, particularly in the case of mergers. 
 
C. Standards of Review in Delaware 
a. General Introduction of Standards of Review 
Since 1985, unprecedented development in both the capital and the international product 
market created the environment for Delaware court to develop a body of rules to impose legal 
order upon the directors’ action, especially in the context of corporate takeovers.41 The end 
result was the articulation by Delaware courts of the standards of review in cases42 respecting 
the takeovers.  
In corporate law, a judicial standard of review is a verbal expression that describes the task a 
court performs in determining whether actions taken by corporate directors violated their 
fiduciary duties.43 Similarly, Delaware’s standards of review reflect significant value judgments 
of Delaware’s courts regarding the utility of permitting greater or lesser insulation of director 
conduct from judicial scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                                                              
97,214, 97,218 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987) (directors’ duty is to maximize the amount to be received by shareholders); 
Edelman v. Freuhauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1986) (board is obligated to “negotiate the best deal for the 
shareholders”); and Interco, 551 A.2d at 803 (“The board’s duty is to act . . . so as to encourage the best possible 
result from shareholders' point of view.”); and In re Fort Howard Corp., No. 9991, slip op. at 29-30 (board’s duty is 
to seek best transaction available), reprinted in 14 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] at 719. 
40
 Symposium, Corporate Law in the Twenty-first Century: The Practitioners’ Prognosis, 25 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] 161, 
170 (2000). 
41
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 866. 
42
 See, e.g., Smith v.Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 
(Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) and Blasius Industries, 
Inc. v. Atlas Corp. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
43
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2 at 867. 
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Generally, standards of review function to: 
(i) provide judges with a practical and logical framework to determine whether corporate 
directors have fulfilled their duties in a particular context and the appropriate remedies if they 
have not; (ii) avoid needless complexity that creates opportunities for inefficient processing of 
cases that have little likelihood of ultimate success; and (iii) be aligned with the public policies 
that animate the corporate law by providing incentives for directors to act in a manner most 
likely to advance corporate and stockholder interests, and by deferring to outcomes reached 
through effective intracorporate dispute resolution mechanisms.44 
Based on these functions, two primary standards of judicial review have developed under 
Delaware law. These standards include (i) the business judgment rule, which is a gross 
negligence standard of review for claims that directors are liable for damages caused by their 
inattention—a standard that would require a plaintiff to prove both a breach of the duty and the 
fact and extent of any damages caused by the breach; and (ii) a rehabilitated entire fairness 
standard to address duty of loyalty claims.45 
  
b. Business Judgment Rule  
 The business judgment rule  
“is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse 
of the discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is 
on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the 
presumption.”46  
This standard of review reflects the Delaware courts’ great deference to the directors, since 
they have greater expertise with regard to business matters and are more familiar with the 
                                                  
44
 Id. at 869-870 
45
 Id. at 865. 
46
 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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business of the company than the judges. Thus, the courts generally will not second-guess the 
directors’ decisions, as long as the decision-making process is unaffected by fraud or other 
negative influences.   
 However, not every director’s action may be protected by the business judgment rule. 
Generally, to be protected by the business judgment rule, five criteria must be satisfied: (i) a 
business decision; (ii) disinterestedness; (iii) due care; (iv) good faith; and (v) no abuse of 
discretion or waste of corporate assets.47 Therefore, the business judgment rule shields directors 
from liability when the foregoing five elements are present, and at the same time, the business 
judgment rule creates a presumption in favor of the directors that each of the elements of the rule 
has been satisfied.48  
Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking to establish a breach of the duty of care first must establish 
facts sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule’s presumption that the directors acted 
with due care.49 If the plaintiff is able to do so, the burden of proof shifts to the directors to 
prove that they did in fact act with the requisite degree of care. Gross negligence and an 
uninformed directors’ decision50 may overcome the business judgment rule’s presumption 
regarding the due care. However, even if such presumption is rebutted, and the directors cannot 
establish they acted with the requisite degree of care, the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on a 
duty of care claim only if he can establish the other elements required to prove liability, 
including proximate causation, damages and/or the necessity for injunctive relief.51 
                                                  
47
 See Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 17, at 20. 
48
 Id. at 53. 
49
 See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990) and Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 
1985). 
50
 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
51
 See Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 17, at 54-55. 
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Thus, the business judgment rule affords directors with a great protection in cases where 
only the duty of care has been implicated rather than in cases involving self-dealing, waste, fraud, 
or any other illegality or ultra vires conduct, all of which will be judged under the entire fairness 
standard.    
 
c. Entire Fairness Standard 
 Normally, duty of care and duty of loyalty claims against directors are under different 
standards of review. In particular, the standards of review to be applied depend upon the 
threshold inquiry into whether there is a conflicting interest.52 If disinterested directors exercise 
their independent judgment in good faith, the only issue will be whether the directors have 
breached their duty of care. Thus, the directors will not be charged with any violation of loyalty, 
and they will not be required to undertake any defense or carry any burden of proof until the 
plaintiff has presented the evidence adequate to rebut the presumption of the business judgment 
rule.  
Claimed breaches of the duty of loyalty, on the other hand, are reviewed under the far more 
exacting standard—entire fairness. This standard of review is required largely as a matter of 
policy. Specially, it is assumed that a board that is not conflicted is motivated to achieve the 
highest transaction price the market will permit, and in those circumstances where the directors’ 
and shareholders’ interests are aligned, there is no reason for courts to engage in a substantive 
review of the board's decision.53 In contrast, where a majority of the board is conflicted, i.e., 
where a majority have personal interests in the transaction that are adverse to the interest of the 
shareholders, it cannot be presumed that the board will be motivated to achieve the best interests 
                                                  
52
 Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 2, at 874. 
53
 Id. at 875. 
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for the corporation and shareholders in effectuating a given transaction.54 Therefore, in conflict 
transactions that implicate the directors' duty of loyalty, the court imposes upon the directors the 
burden of showing that the transaction is entirely fair as to both process and price, and engages in 
the most searching review of the substance of the board's decision.55 Though the application of 
the entire fairness standard does not represent per se liability on the directors, the director’s 
burden to demonstrate intrinsic fairness in such a transaction is a heavy burden and not easily 
satisfied. Therefore, the entire fairness standard is only applied to the circumstances where the 
directors breach their loyalty duty. 
 
d. Directors’ Personal Liabilities under Different Fiduciary Duties  
 As stated above, fiduciary duties have a basic function, through a personal liability 
imposition, to optimally reduce the possibility that directors will favor personal interests over the 
corporation’s interests. 56  During the mid-1980s, a widespread perception developed that 
corporate directors faced an increased likelihood of being held liable for monetary damages. This 
perception, coupled with sharply rising defense costs57  resulted in many directors to be 
unwilling to perform on corporate boards or to merely confine their official duties to the regular 
and non-risk management affairs of the corporation.  
Following the 1985 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van Gorkom,58 
which held directors liable for breaching the duty of care, Delaware, and then virtually all other 
states, amended their corporate codes to allow corporations to eliminate director liability for 
                                                  
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 See O’Kelley & Thompson, supra note 3, at 221.  
57
 See Block, Barton & Radin, supra note 17, at 942. 
58
 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care.59 Specially, Delaware General Corporation 
Law section 102(b)(7) provides:  
“A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the 
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the 
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under 
section 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director 
derived an improper personal benefit…”60 
Therefore, section 102(b)(7) provides that in Delaware the directors suffer no monetary 
damages arising from the breaches of their due care but shall bear the corresponding 
responsibility for their breaches against the duty of loyalty if the corporation chooses to adopt 
these provisions in its articles of association or bylaw. Thus, even if the directors are found to 
have violated their duty of care, they only take liability in guise rather than suffer an actual 
monetary loss. However, if the directors are found to have breached their loyalty duty, they will 
be personally liable for monetary damage. Due to the great difference in the monetary liability 
imposition depending on the type of breach, characterizing alleged directorial misconduct as 
violating the duty of care or loyalty is always a key issue in the cases regarding fiduciary duties.   
                                                  
59
 Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate Governance, 24 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] 1 
(1999). 
60
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8§102(b) (7) (2003). 
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CHAPTER 3  
INTRODUCTION OF GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS 
A. Current Economic Conditions Favoring Going-private Transactions 
a. Historical Background 
During the last half of the 1990s, many companies were formed through venture investment 
and then taken public through initial public offerings (IPOs).61 However, due to the plummeted 
stock valuations since March 2000 62 and the issuance of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the 
“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”),63 which significantly increases the administrative costs and perceived 
risks to directors of remaining a public company,64 more directors and controlling shareholders 
have been encouraged to seek the relative safety and a higher revenue value of being a private 
company.65  
The common method for the controlling shareholders to pursue a good financial rewarding 
through effectuating a going-private transaction is to firstly take a public company private and 
then either to operate it profitably as a private company and bring it back to public again through 
                                                  
61
 Cannon, supra note 9, at 198. 
62
 Id. 
63
 H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted). 
64
 The SEC adopted final disclosure and compliance rules on January 15, 2003 as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. These rules set forth extensive new requirements, including that filing companies must comply with new code 
of ethics disclosure requirements by July 15, 2003. See SEC Release No. 33-8177 at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004). The SEC also introduced a new Regulation 
G, which applies whenever a public company discloses material information that includes non-GAAP financial 
measures. See SEC Release No. 33-8176 at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8176.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004); 
See also SEC Release No. 33-8182 at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8182.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004). 
65
 See Michael V. Copeland, For Some Companies it Pays to be Private, [Red Herring], at 66 (Feb. 20, 2003) (“in 
this environment, it's definitely easier being a private company than a public company,” and “a number of mid-to 
late-stage private companies that are cash-flow positive are valued at revenue multiple twice that of their public 
counterparts” at http://www.redherring.com/vc/2003/02/private). 
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an IPO when markets recover, or to sell the business in a negotiated private transaction.66 An 
example of the successful execution of this public-private-public formula can be found in the 
case of Duracell International.67  
One of the reasons that type of a formula can achieve a great success is that taking an 
undervalued company private in a depressed financial market can make the corporate 
management focus on long-term growth and development and introduction of innovative 
technologies rather than reporting short-term performance to public investors.68  Thus, after a 
successful operation for a number of years as a private company, bringing a corporate back to the 
financial market in more promising times may not only maximize the application of the 
corporate management sources but also bring significant financial rewards to the controlling 
shareholders as well. Not surprisingly then, more corporations have recently embraced the 
go-private solution including Dole Food Co., entertainment company Dave & Buster’s, Chemical 
and mineral manufacturer International Specialty Products, TEK DigiTel Corp., and Infodata 
Sustems, Inc.69    
 
                                                  
66
 Canon, supra note 9, at 200. 
67
 Twenty years of Buying and Selling Companies, [Forbes], Dec. 13, 1999, at 184 
In June 1988, Kraft, Inc. sold its battery subsidiary, Duracell, to an acquisition group comprised of buyout firm 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (“KKR”) and members of Duracell's management. The acquisition group paid 
approximately $ 1.8 billion for Duracell. This equates to a value of approximately $ 5 per share, adjusted in terms of 
shares outstanding at the time of Duracell's eventual 1996 acquisition by The Gillette Company (“Gillette”). KKR 
took Duracell public again in May 1991 in a stock offering that raised $ 518 million and valued the company at $ 1.5 
billion. Then, in 1996, Gillette bought Duracell for $ 7.8 billion in a stock swap transaction. This transaction valued 
Duracell at about $ 55 per share, as contrasted with the $ 5 per share price paid by the acquisition group just eight 
years earlier. Moreover, by the time of the Gillette transaction, KKR had already made approximately $ 1.2 billion 
from earlier sales of Gillette stock, giving KKR an approximate thirty-nine percent annual compounded return on 
investment. One way to look at this transaction from KKR's perspective is that the $ 350 million KKR originally 
invested in Duracell ultimately returned $ 4.22 billion. 
68
 Through innovation and improved marketing, Duracell's net income increased from a loss of $ 105 million in 
1989 to a gain of $ 245 million in fiscal year 1996, while cash flow through that period increased at an annual 
compounded rate of seventeen percent, as opposed to cash flow growth having been flat under Kraft. See Building 
the Arc, Business Standard, July 30, 2002, at   http://www.business-standard.com/strategist/bookshelf.asp 
69
 Canon, supra note 9, at n.34. 
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b. Benefits of Going-private Transactions 
At present, the market capitalization of many companies is significantly less than it was only 
a couple of years ago.70 Being a public company no longer means easy access to capital. 
Moreover, today there is less prestige inherent in being publicly traded than there was just in the 
late 1990s.71 Any benefit to being a public company in the eyes of issuers, suppliers, financiers, 
and public investors has significantly diminished since the explosion of the scandals regarding 
Enron, World Com, and Nortel. Under these circumstances, the advantages of going-private 
seem more substantial to the controlling party.  
Additionally, the significant costs that come along with remaining as a public company, such 
as executive fees, legal expenses, accounting costs, and SEC filing and Reporting fees, will drop 
greatly.72  
As a general rule, going-private transactions, like a parent-subsidiary merger provide benefits 
for the continuing enterprise where the value of the combined entity is greater than the value of 
the separate concerns.73 Such gains accrue due to streamlined management, tax benefits, reduced 
competition, asset shifting, and overall economies of scale among others.74 To take executive 
costs as an example,75 going-private may allow management greater flexibility to focus on 
                                                  
70
 Id. at 203. 
71
 Id. at 204. 
72
 Joseph L. Johnson III & Andrew J. Weidhaas, The Going-Private Transaction, [N.Y. L.J.], Nov. 13, 2001. 
(“While the actual cost of remaining a public company varies greatly depending on factors including the number of 
transactions engaged in by the company, the number of stock trades executed by officers and directors, and the cost 
of the accounting and legal services utilized by the company, one commentator has concluded that even a small 
public company can spend approximately $ 1 million a year on costs directly related to being a public company.”) 
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 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 [YALE L.J.] 698, 706 (1982) (“A 
freeze-out of minority shareholders in a long standing subsidiary will produce gains if the value of the combined 
entity is greater than the sum of the separate values of the parent and the subsidiary."). 
74
 Peter D. Santori, Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg: the Supreme Court Injects Federalism into the Implied Private 
Right of Action for Breach of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-9. A Taste of Things to Come?, 17 
[DEL. J. CORP. L.] 1007, 1018 (1992). 
75
 See supra note 67 for a discussion of executive costs in the context of Duracell case noted above. 
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research and development and to implement strategies with a long-term view toward corporation 
building so as to maximize the overall value of the company, rather than to simply aim to satisfy 
the public investors in a short term. To give another example from the tax perspective, it may 
also be easier and cheaper to extract cash dividends from a private company. 76  After 
going-private, owners may be able to convert the company to a limited liability company or a 
subchapter S corporation77 and avoid the double taxation that occurs at the corporate and 
personal levels when a corporate structure is used.78 
Another benefit of a going-private transaction also emanates from the law of agency.79  As 
companies go private, the friction between the principal (the stockholders) and agent (the 
corporate directors) is eliminated80 because there are no minority shareholders remaining in the 
corporation. This reduced friction translates into lower agency costs and, therefore, higher 
returns to the investor.81 
 
B. Structure of Going-private Transaction 
a. Key Participants in a Going-private Transaction 
An important starting point in understanding the structure of the going-private transaction is 
to recognize the primary players and their roles. There are three key participants in going-private 
transactions. 
                                                  
76
 Canon, supra note 9, at 208. 
77
 An “S Corporation” is a small business corporation, as defined at Internal Revenue Code 1361(a)(1) for which an 
election to be taxed under Subchapter S of the Code is in effect for the year. Generally, an S Corporation may have 
no more than 75 shareholders. See 33 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Taxation 4552 (2002).  
78
 See 33 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Taxation 4000 (2002) (for how C Corporations are taxed). See also 33 Am. Jur. 2d 
Federal Taxation 4621 (2002) (for how S Corporations are taxed). 
79
 Santori, supra note 74, at 1018. 
80
 Id. 
81
 Id. 
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First, the board of directors, as the management body of the company, will play a critical role 
in many successful going-private transactions. Since only that current board will know best of 
the various conditions of the corporation, including its assets status, the mid-term or long-term 
operation plans, the approximate share value, the past corporate malfeasance, and so forth.  
Second, the controlling shareholder plays a pivotal role, even if it has not initiated the 
transaction because its acquiescence to the transaction is required. There may or may not be a 
majority shareholder, but where one exists who is not a member of the acquisition group, the 
acquisition group would be well advised to extract a pledge of support from the majority 
shareholder prior to initiating an offer to acquire the company.82  Unless the controlling 
shareholder votes its shares in favor of the offer, the transaction will not be consummated. 
Third, the special committee of the board and its advisors also may play a central role in a 
related-party acquisition. Depending upon the deal structure selected, the board of the target 
company may be required to appoint a special committee83 comprised of independent directors 
to negotiate with the acquisition group and recommend to the larger board and the shareholders 
whether to accept the acquisition bid.84 Where the deal structure compels the use of a special 
committee and where such committee properly discharges its duties such as to receive an opinion 
regarding the fairness of the acquisition bid from a financial advisor of the committee's choosing, 
                                                  
82
 Canon, supra note 9, at 215. 
83
 Dennnis J. Block et al. The Duty of Loyalty and the Evolution of the Scope of Judicial Review, 59 [BROOK. L. 
REV.] 65, 65 (“Enormous changes have occurred in the governance of public companies, including changes in the 
composition of boards of directors resulting in more disinterested and independent boards and the utilization of 
specialized board committees consisting of disinterested and independent directors to address conflict-of-interest 
transactions and related issues.”) 
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 See In re Home Shopping Network, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 12868, at 29 (Del. Ch. 1993). (“A tender 
offer does not require the appointment of a special committee as it is deemed a transaction directly between the 
acquisition group and individual shareholders. A negotiated merger transaction between the acquisition group and 
the company, however, will generally require the appointment of a special committee of independent directors where 
the acquisition group includes executives or directors of the company.”). 
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Delaware courts will be to impose upon the shareholders challenging the transaction the burden 
of showing that the transaction was unfair.85  
 
b. Two Main Methods of Structuring Going-private transactions 
There are two main ways to structure the going-private transaction. The first is the commonly 
adopted merger. The second is so-called tender offer.  
 
(a) Mergers  
A statutory merger is a transaction whereby two or more corporations are combined into one 
of the corporations, usually referred to as the surviving corporation. When the merger is effected, 
the legal existence of all constituent corporations other than the surviving corporation ceases.86 
In a consolidation, the surviving entity is not one of the constituent corporations as in merger but, 
rather, a newly created consolidated corporation.87 By operation of law, the assets and liabilities 
of all constituent corporations pass to that surviving corporation.88    
Deciding whether to vote for a merger is one of the basic rights of all shareholders of the 
corporation. Therefore, generally, most states including Delaware require the board of directors 
to first adopt a plan of merger with specified terms and to present that plan to the shareholders. 
After the requisite shareholders’ approval, the plan shall be filed with the state corporations 
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 See Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (“Ordinarily, in a challenged transaction involving 
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commissioner.89 Once the merger becomes effective as set forth in the plan, the terms apply to 
all shareholders, even those who voted against that merger plan.90  
Generally, the group seeking to acquire the company (the “acquisition group”) will first 
negotiate with the board of directors of the target company and agree on terms that are then 
reflected in an agreement of merger.91 If approved by the required percentage of shareholders, 
the merger transaction will be consummated, after which the acquisition group will either 
directly or indirectly own all of the equity interest in the target company. 
However, as for going-private mergers in which controlling shareholders are the members of 
the acquisition group, a situation arises where the possible conflicts of interest are involved. In 
light of the controlling shareholders’ dominance over directors and officers and standing to 
pursue interests diverging from those of other shareholders in an acquisition transaction, 
Delaware laws state that transactions involving a controlling shareholder that are structured as a 
merger are required to meet the “entire fairness” test.92 Under this test, the burden of showing 
that the transaction was fair to minority shareholders rests initially on the controlling 
shareholders and the interested directors of the company. In order to shift the burden of proof on 
those shareholders challenging the fairness of the transaction, the board of the target corporation 
often appoints a special committee of disinterested directors to review and approve the merger 
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 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8§262(a) (2003) (“Appraisal is available only to shareholders that did not vote in favor of 
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proposal in advance.93 Though the mere formation of a special committee cannot always shift 
the burden of proof,94 the board of the target corporation still pins its hope on such committee’s 
action through the whole transaction. Therefore in a going-private merger, the special committee 
may often play a critical role as will be further discussed in Part III. 
    
(b) Tender offers 
An alternative to engaging in a merger transaction is tender offer. In the 1960’s, tender offers, 
which already had been in use in England, became an increasingly popular method for corporate 
control in the United States.95 Interestingly, however, indeed the very term “tender offer” is 
undefined.96 Generally, the “conventional” tender offer was described in the House Report of 
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, for the hearings on the proposed Williams 
Act,97 which was adopted in 1968 in response to the growing use of cash tender offers as a 
means for achieving corporate takeovers.98 That report described “tender offers” as “normally 
consist[ing] of a bid by an individual or group to buy shares of a company—usually at a price 
above the current market.”99  In defining “tender offer,” the case law followed the Williams 
Act’s legislative history, which made it clear that the Williams Act was not intended to be 
restricted to conventional tender offers but rather was meant to encompass all methods of 
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takeovers sought to be achieved by a large-scale stock purchase program.100 Regardless of 
which definition of “tender offer” is most accepted, to be sure, Congress, the Commission, and 
the courts commonly understand the concept to be a limited, conditional public invitation to all 
target shareholders to tender their shares at a particular price (usually a premium).101  
A certain tender offer in the context of going-private transactions often involves the 
acquisition group making an offer directly to the public shareholders of the company to acquire 
their shares. The acquisition group is required to make extensive disclosures with respect to the 
tender offer through the filing of a Schedule TO.102  
The tender offer is a powerful tool103 not only because its consummation generally takes less 
time than a merger since neither prior SEC review104 nor first approval or recommendations 
from the board of directors towards the tender offer is required but also because the possible 
resulting short-form merger following the close of the tender offer.105 Therefore, many tender 
offer transactions are conditioned on the acquisition group owning at least ninety percent of the 
target company stock following the close of the tender offer so that the acquisition group can 
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then conduct a short-form merger to eliminate the non-tendering shares106 and finally reach the 
same result as a negotiated merger transaction. 
  
c. The Process of Going-private 
The process for taking a company private largely hinges on the deal structure selected. In a 
transaction structured as a merger, the first step is generally for the acquisition group to make an 
offer to the board of directors of the company, which then establishes a special committee of 
independent directors to negotiate the offer with the acquisition group. However, in the case of a 
tender offer, the first public step is for the acquisition group to make a public announcement, 
often through a newspaper advertisement, of its intention to make an offer to buy shares directly 
from the shareholders. Under Delaware law, the fiduciary duties in those two deal structures 
imposed on the directors are different, and similarly, the applied standards of review and the 
burden of proof are also distinguishable. The question regarding the directorial fiduciary duties 
in the context of going-private transactions is thoroughly discussed in the following section. 
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CHAPTER 4   
DIRECTORIAL DUTIES IN THE CONTROLLED GOING-PRIVATE 
 MERGERS UNDER DELAWARE LAW 
Since the merger is both the most commonly used measure in going-private transactions and 
at the same time, “it is also the most important event occurring in a small corporation’s life,”107 
the fiduciary duties borne by the directors in this context is often a hot topic among the 
commentators108 as well as the courts.109 Because this article is limited in its scope to the 
context of going-private mergers initiated by the controlling shareholders for a regular business 
purpose rather than for a response to a hostile acquisition, the question of how to impose the 
potential directorial duties is further complicated with the mixing of those two opposing 
elements, the merger and the existing fiduciary duties owed by controlling shareholders to the 
minority shareholders due to that controlling interest.  As a starting point, under Delaware law, 
the standard of review applied in “a merger by a controlling or dominating shareholder” may be 
distinguished from that applied in a common merger. Thus, defining who constitutes a 
controlling shareholder is the preliminary issue which must be decided first in order to ascertain 
the proper stand of review applied to the going-private merger context.  
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A. How to Distinguish a “Controlling Shareholder”  
A “controlling shareholder” is “a shareholder who is in a position to influence the 
corporation’s activities because the shareholder either owns a majority of outstanding shares or 
owns a smaller percentage but a significant number of the remaining shares are widely 
distributed among many others.110 Under Delaware law, controlling shareholders like the 
directors and officers, owe fiduciary duties to the corporation’s shareholder body as a whole, 
including minority shareholders,111 due to their exercise of the controlling shareholder’s power. 
As to whether a controlling shareholder exists, the number of owned shares is not always a 
decisive element. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that “a shareholder who owns less than 
50% of a corporation’s outstanding stock does not, without more, become a controlling 
shareholder of that corporation… For a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of 
controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must allege domination by a minority shareholder 
through actual control of corporate conduct.”112  Therefore, we may conclude that domination 
and control may be the result of either (1) ownership of or the unrestricted power to vote more 
than fifty percent of the corporation’s outstanding voting securities or (2) actual control over a 
majority of the corporation’s board of directors or other managing body.113 With regard to the 
second criteria, there is no a specified threshold in share number to determine whether or not the 
control exists, it requires the court to conduct a case by case fact-review to determine that 
question. 
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B. Standards of Review in the Controlled Going-private Mergers 
a. Related Statutory Rules and Cases in Delaware  
The Delaware legislature has codified many of the rules to govern the duties of directors and 
the controlling shareholders to the minority shareholders in the context of a merger. In addition, 
in order to better clarify those rules, they are also accompanied with many notes based on the 
related cases.   
The main rules that cover mergers, consolidations, and conversions are from Sections 251 
through 266 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.114 Of those sections, Sections 251, 253 
and their supplemented case-based notes are the main statutory sources to address issues such as 
the fiduciary duties, standards of review, and burdens of proof. 
 
(a) Section 251 and Case-based Notes  
Section 251 mainly covers mergers or consolidations of Delaware domestic corporations and 
limited liability companies.115 In its case-based notes, Section 251 generally mentions the 
fiduciary duties owed to the minority shareholders and the related burden of proof arising from a 
going-private merger.   
It states: “Mergers which present a classic ‘going-private’ transaction, with the majority 
having complete control over the timing of the ‘squeeze play’ on the public stockholders…call 
for the strictest observance of the law of fiduciary duty116…Where a cohesive group of 
stockholders with majority voting power is irrevocably committed to the merger transaction, 
effective representation of the financial interests of the minority shareholders imposes upon the 
                                                  
114
 DEL. Code Ann. Tit. 8 §§ 251-266 (2003) 
115
 DEL. Code Ann. Tit. 8 §251 (2003) 
116
 DEL. Code Ann. Tit. 8 §251 (2003), Notes; See also Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. Supr. 
1979), overruled on other grounds, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. Supr.1983). 
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board an affirmative responsibility to protect those minority shareholders' interests; the board 
cannot abdicate its fiduciary duties to the minority by leaving it to the stockholders alone to 
approve or disapprove the merger agreement where stockholders already combine to establish a 
majority of the voting power that makes the outcome of the stockholder vote a foregone 
conclusion.”117  
Except for the previous mentions of “the strictest observance of fiduciary duties”118 and 
board’s fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders in the coercive situation,119 the notes of 
Section 251 address the burden of proof issue as “[a] corporate majority stockholder and the 
directors of the subsidiary as nominees of the majority stockholder occupy, in relation to the 
minority, a fiduciary position in dealing with the subsidiary’s property and bear the burden of 
establishing the fairness of a merger plan, and it must pass the test of careful scrutiny by the 
courts.”120   
 
(b) Section 253 and Case-based Notes    
Compared with Section 251, Section 253 is more specialized in addressing issues such as a 
going-private merger structured by the controlling shareholders, like the one between the parent 
corporation and the subsidiary or subsidiaries.121    
With regard to the applied standards of review, its case-based notes state: “The exclusive 
standard of judicial review in examining the propriety of an interested cash-out merger 
                                                  
117
 DEL. Code Ann. Tit. 8 §251 (2003), Notes; See also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 
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transaction by a controlling or dominating shareholder is entire fairness.122 In parent-subsidiary 
merger transactions the issues are those of fairness—fair price and fair dealing.”123 As for the 
burden of establishing the fairness, the statutory notes state: “In a parent-subsidiary merger 
context, shareholder ratification operates only to shift the burden of persuasion, not to change the 
substantive standard of review which should be entire fairness; nor does the fact that the merger 
was negotiated by a committee of independent, disinterested directors alter the review 
standard.”124  
 
b. Applied Standards of Review in the Controlled Going-private Merger 
From the Delaware statutory rules and those notes arising from the relevant cases, we may 
find that the standard of review applied in a going-private merger by a controlling shareholder 
(including a parent-subsidiary merger) is entire fairness standard. The burden of proof to 
establish such entire fairness is on the controlling shareholders standing on both sides of the 
transaction through control of the corporate machinery.  
 However, should the very entire fairness standard as addressed in sections 251, 253, and the 
case-based notes shall be applied, in the context of such a controlled merger, to all the involved 
fiduciaries to the minority shareholders, including the controlling stockholders, the members of a 
special committee composed of those independent and disinterested directors and the managers? 
That question, though rarely discussed, seemingly cannot be disregarded in our analysis about 
the issue of the directorial fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders.        
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 DEL. Code Ann. Tit. 8 §253 (2003), Notes; See also Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Del. Supr. 638 A.2d 
1110 (1994). 
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 DEL. Code Ann. Tit. 8 §253 (2003), Notes; See also Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., Del. Supr. 535 A.2d 840 
(1987). 
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C. Directorial Duties in the Controlled Going-private Merger   
As previously mentioned, in a controlled going-private merger, there are at least three kinds 
of fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders borne by three different types of corporate 
fiduciaries. The first category of fiduciary is the controlling shareholders;125 the second is the 
directors,126 and the third is the managers or the corporation officers.127      
 It is well reflected in many cases in Delaware,128 that in a going-private merger structured 
by the controlling shareholder, the business judgment rule protection is precluded, and the 
controlling shareholders have the burden of demonstrating the fairness of that transaction.129 It is 
almost impossible not to arouse any doubt in a reasonable person’s mind about the fairness of 
most general transactions where a party not only stands on both sides but also has a controlled 
voting power, let alone in such a critical one as the merger. Therefore, it is persuasive to regard 
the fiduciary duties of a controlling shareholder arising from the controlled going-private merger 
as a duty of loyalty and impose an entire fairness standard accordingly. That is also deeply 
rooted in the above analysis on Delaware statutory rules and related cases.130 However, the 
fiduciary duties on those controlling shareholders are not equal to those on the involved director 
if he is fully independent and disinterested as a member of the special committee.131     
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 See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988); Singner v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-77 
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Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10. 
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a. Duties of Disinterested Directors as the Special Committee Member  
(a) Disinterestedness and Independence  
As discussed above, the special committee of the board often has a central role in the 
controlled going-private merger and is usually comprised of disinterested and independent 
directors to represent and protect the interests of the minority shareholders 132  through a 
negotiation with the controlling shareholders and a recommendation to the shareholders of 
whether to accept the bidder’s offer. 
  The disinterestedness requirement under Delaware law mainly means that director has no 
personal interests in the related transaction.133 The personal interest has often been described as 
“either a financial interest or entrenchment on the part of the directors.”134 Further, to create a 
reasonable doubt as to the director’s disinterestedness, such interest must be material.135 
Therefore, in assessing whether the director is interested, the Delaware court must consider facts 
bearing on the significance or magnitude of the conflicting financial interests at stake.136 
The director’s independence requires that he is not “dominated or otherwise controlled by an 
individual or entity interested in the transaction137 and does not adopt “a direction of corporate 
conduct comporting with the wishes or interests of the controlling person or entity.”138 As 
                                                                                                                                                              
member of the special committee. That we combine the fiduciary duties of a disinterested director and that of a 
member of the special committee together is mainly for 2 reasons: one is that it is a common way for the 
disinterested directors, through the special committee, to participate in such a transaction and the other is to avoid a 
tautology.   
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 Brown, Maimone & Schoell, supra note 26, at 1164.  
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 Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188-89 (Del. 1988).  
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 Id. at 188. 
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 See, e.g., Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 595 n.7 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also Cede & Co., 634 
A.2d at 364. 
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 Rothenberg, No. 11,749, slip op. at 9, reprinted in 21[DEL. J. CORP. L.] at 317. 
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 Grobow, 539 A.2d at 189 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815-16); see also Bodkin, No. 13,770, slip op. at 9, 
reprinted in 22 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] at 1164 
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 Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971); see also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 626 (Del. 
   - 32 - 
“control” and “domination” are difficult terms to define with precision, Delaware courts explain 
such terms to require “actual control” from the interested director or controlling shareholders to 
that disinterested director.139 In determining the existence of “actual” control, courts have 
suggested that directors who are employees of the corporation shall be excluded from serving on 
special committees because that employment can make the directors “beholden” to the interested 
directors or the controlling stockholders.140 As explained by the Delaware Court of Chancery, in 
the context of a “parent-subsidiary” merger, where the members of the subsidiary’s board were 
employees of the parent, the directors were deemed to be “beholden” to the parent. That is, as 
key employees of the parent corporation, those directors were entitled, indeed obligated, to 
demonstrate their loyalty to their employer whose directions they were bound to follow, but 
having assumed the position of directors of the subsidiary that also had other stockholders, those 
defendants became fiduciaries for the minority shareholders with a concomitant affirmative duty 
to protect the interests of the minority, as well as the majority, stockholders.141 
Although courts have suggested that a special committee formed to negotiate with an 
interested fiduciary should be comprised of non-employee directors,142 the failure to comply 
with this suggestion may not “cause the transaction to be invalidated, provided that there are 
countervailing procedural safeguards, such as the arm’s length and adversarial negotiations, 
adequately calculated to protect the shareholders’ interests.”143 In Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.,144 
                                                                                                                                                              
1984). 
139
 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Del. 1989). 
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 See Iseman v. Liquid Air Corp., No. 9694, slip op. at 7 (Del. Ch. 1989), reprinted in 15 [DEL. J. CORP. L.] 1041, 
1047 (1990); In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 10,598 (Cons.), 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 27, at 35-36 (Del. 
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the Delaware Supreme Court, notwithstanding the presence of employee directors on the special 
committee, still recognized that adequate countervailing procedure safeguarding calculated to 
protect the interests of the public stockholders.145   
 Simply stated, the existence of an employment relationship between a director and the 
corporation is not a dispositive fact in determining whether a disinterested director was 
controlled or dominated by an interested fiduciary. The existence of the employment agreement, 
however, creates the “potential” for dependence and such potential (where coupled with 
additional facts) could result in a court deciding that a disinterested director was controlled or 
dominated by the interested fiduciaries.146 
 
(b) The Role of the Special Committee 
The Delaware Courts have recognized the special committee as “an acceptable surrogate for 
the energetic, informed and aggressive negotiation that one would reasonably expect from an 
arm’s-length adversary.”147  
Simply stated, where a special committee emulates “that arm’s length process,” the interests 
of public stockholders are protected.148 Thus, numerous decisions of Delaware courts have 
described the duties of a special committee where such committee is created and empowered to 
conduct “arm’s-length” negotiations with an interested party.149  
As explained by the Delaware Courts, that arm’s length process should assure that the 
controlled transaction be “accomplished only on terms fair to the public shareholders and 
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representing the best available terms from the shareholders' point of view.”150 In the context of a 
controlled going-private merger, the Delaware court requires those independent and disinterested 
director members of the special committee “to say no to any transaction that is not fair to those 
shareholders and is not the best transaction available.”151 In addition, according to the court, “it 
is not sufficient for such directors to achieve the best price that a controlling shareholder will pay 
if that price is not a fair price. Nor is [if] sufficient to get a price that falls within a range of ‘fair 
values’ somehow defined, if the controlling shareholder (or another) would pay more.”152 The 
final result the special committee shall pursue through its power is to say no “to force the 
controlling shareholder to choose among the options of implementing a frank self-dealing 
transaction at a price that knowledgeable directors have disapproved, to improve the terms of the 
transaction or abandon the transaction.”153  
 Pursuant to the foregoing Delaware statutory rules and case law,154 however, the presence 
of a committee of independent, disinterested directors in the context of a going-private merger 
operates only to shift the burden of persuasion, not to change the substantive standard of review, 
which should be entire fairness. Therefore, except for a practical and possible protection for the 
interests of those public shareholders, another primary function of the special committee in the 
controlled merger is to shift the burden of proof from the controlling shareholders to the 
stockholders challenging the fairness of the merger.155  
Nonetheless, the mere formation of a special committee by the corporate fiduciaries is not 
enough to shift the burden of proof. A precondition to that is a fact-intensive inquiry into 
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whether the special committee is truly independent, fully informed, and has the freedom to 
negotiate at arm’s length.156 “Unless the controlling or dominating shareholder can demonstrate 
that it has not only formed an independent committee but also replicated a process as though 
each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power at arm’s length, their 
burden of proving fairness will not shift.”157  
In addition to the required burden on the controlling shareholder to demonstrate the 
disinterestedness and independence of the committee, the committee itself also must establish 
that the decision is made on the “fully informed”158 base and arm’s length. In a 1997 decision, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the special committee failed to satisfy its fully-informed 
burden because two members of the three person committee did not attend the informational 
meetings with the committee’s advisor and thus failed to involve themselves in the committee’s 
functions with the requisite level of “care, attention and sense of responsibility” required of 
them.159 In order to demonstrate they are fully-informed, the directors will often rely upon the 
consultation of legal and financial advisors, which also has become a common component of a 
court’s assessment of such directors’ conduct.160   
 
(c) The Applied Standard of Review  
As the surrogate of the minority shareholders, a committee of the disinterested and 
independent directors must undertake the corresponding fiduciary duties. However, the question 
arises as to which standard of review shall be applied to those directors. Because it is in the 
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context of a going-private merger structured by the controlling shareholder where the minority 
shareholders need more protection than those in other conflicting-interest transactions as well as 
because Delaware courts have identified the entire fairness standard to apply in such a context 
regardless of whether there is a formation of the special committee, shall the standard of review 
to the fiduciary duties on those disinterested and independent directors but be entire fairness 
standard as well? The answer to this not fully-discussed question161 is in the negative for the 
following reasons. First, the entire fairness standard as established by the Delaware courts162 is 
applied to the controlling shareholders but is not explicitly employed to the committee composed 
of those truly disinterested and independent directors. Had the entire fairness standard been 
applied to those directors, the effect would be to treat the independent committee members in the 
exact same way as to those interested and controlled directors for whom the applied standard of 
review is entire fairness.163 This would raise a great unfairness between those two very different 
sorts of directors.  
In addition, to apply the entire fairness standard to the conduct of those director members is 
contradictory against the conduct assessment for the committee, described by the Delaware 
courts as to whether such directors’ conduct is “truly independent, fully informed, and have the 
freedom to negotiate at arm’s length.”164 Moreover, the great difficulty of satisfying the 
requirements of the entire fairness standard practically makes it impossible for those directors to 
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demonstrate the satisfaction of their fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders. In addition, the 
entire fairness standard also requires directors to prove that they have not breached their duty of 
loyalty, but if they cannot meet this burden, then they will be personally liable.165 Due to the 
high risk of monetary liability for their failure to establish the entire fairness of the whole 
transaction, the disinterested directors will probably not want to be members of the committee. 
As a result, the failure to create a committee may obstruct the controlling shareholders to process 
such a merger transaction.166  Even where such a merger is still processed, who shall protect the 
interests of the minority shareholders best remains an open issue.     
Third, imposing the same burden of proof on the disinterested directors as the one imposed 
on the controlling shareholders and interested or dependent director, to demonstrate the entire 
fairness of the merger transaction is to totally frustrate the rationality and necessity in the 
creation of such a committee. The application of that standard itself, at the beginning, creates a 
doubt in the disinterestedness and independence of those directors. Seemingly, the creation of 
that committee cannot at all achieve the purpose to best protect the interests of the minority 
shareholders. Besides, such a doubt almost denies the controlling shareholders’ demonstration of 
the disinterestedness and independence of those director committee members and thus the burden 
of proof can never be shifted at all.  
Finally, in Delaware case law, the standard of review applied to the directors in the context of 
merger is not always entire fairness standard. The landmark is the well known “Unocal 
Standard”167 in which the Delaware Supreme Court established that directors are entitled to 
business judgment rule protection after overcoming an initial burden of showing “first, that they 
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had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed 
and second, that the defensive measure decided upon was reasonable in relation to the threat 
posed.”168 Therefore, the entire fairness standard is not automatically applied to the directors in 
the merger context. Moreover, compared with the general duty of care on the directors to the 
corporation that requires the directors to achieve the best interests for the corporation on an 
informed basis, in good faith and the honest belief,169 the duties of the special committee as to 
protect the best interests of the minority shareholders independently, fully informed, and at arm’s 
length170 are very alike. Therefore, in the case law, the Delaware courts also support that the 
standard of review imposed on the committee by those disinterested and independent 
shareholders shall be the business judgment rule if they have discharged their duties properly.171 
In In re First Boston, Inc, Shareholders Litigation,172 Chancellor Allen stated: 
“…where independent directors pursue the goal [to pursue best interests of the 
public shareholders and a fair transaction that is the best transaction available] 
independently, in good faith and diligently, their decision, deserves the respect 
accorded by the business judgment rule.”173 Further, he concluded, “I regard it 
as extremely unlikely that liability could be established against the 
non-interested directors based upon an inadequacy of the price or 
otherwise.”174  
In summary, the fiduciary duties imposed on the committee by those disinterested and 
independent directors are duty of care and their conducts shall be subject to the review under the 
business judgment rule.        
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b. Fiduciary Duties of Interested or Dependent Directors  
(a) The Applied Standard of Review  
Once the directors in the controlled going-private merger transaction are viewed as interested 
or dominated, their fiduciary duty, the same as that of the controlling shareholder, is the duty of 
loyalty and their conducts shall be subject to the review under entire fairness standard.  
For the interested directors, the fairness doctrine is invoked either where the director takes 
advantage of the corporation, by planning and consummating that merger directly with the 
corporation in an unfair manner or at an unfair price175 or according to Delaware courts, “where 
directors are under any influence which sterilizes their discretion” or are dominated or controlled 
by or beholden to an individual or entity interested in the transaction at issue.176 Thus, in the 
context of a going-private merger transaction by the controlled shareholder, when directors are 
interested, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous 
inherent fairness of the bargain177 with those controlling shareholders, and so the guiding 
theoretical principle to counter this problem is fairness.178 
For the dominated or controlled directors, since they are particularly prone to view 
themselves as serving at the pleasure of the controlling shareholder179 during the negotiation, 
they are in the psychologically difficult position of pressing the very parties to whom they 
probably owe their seats on a board,180 the Delaware courts often evince skepticism about the 
weight to be accorded to the opinions of those directors and will not be satisfied until they find, 
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upon a close scrutiny, that a fair dealing has occurred.181 Similarly, once upon those director 
members of the committee are proven either interested or dominated, the business judgment rule 
cannot protect them any more.  
Therefore in the context of a controlled going-private merger, any involved interested or 
dependent directors shall be subject to an entire fairness review and bear a duty of loyalty to 
those minority shareholders. Once the directors cannot demonstrate entire fairness, they face the 
possibility of personal liability for any minority shareholders’ economic damage arising from 
their breach of the loyalty duty pursuant to section 102 (b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law.182   
 
(b) Fair Dealing and Fair Price 
When directors assume a position that involves dual loyalties as previously discussed, the 
final method of insulating them from a liability is to prove that transaction is fair and reasonable 
to the corporation.183 While there is no exact rule for determining what “fairness” means,184 and 
while each court must determine on a case-by-case basis whether a transaction is fair to the 
corporation, there are several tests and many factors that provide guidance. 
As established by the Delaware Supreme Court, “entire fairness” entails a demonstration of 
both fair dealing and fair price: 
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“Fair dealing embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it 
was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the 
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. Fair price relates 
to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including 
all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any 
other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock. 
However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing 
and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the 
question is one of entire fairness.”185 
Fair dealing may be also regarded as the procedural prong with fair price to be viewed as the 
substantive prong.186 Under the procedural prong of fair dealing, the Court analyzes each of the 
listed elements in determining fairness and upheld minority suits where one of the factors has 
been missing.187 The most important component of fair dealing is the duty of “complete 
candor.”188 That duty requires directors’ disclosure of all material facts regarding merger 
transactions to the minority shareholders.189 This duty complements the duty of directors to be 
informed fully so as to inform the shareholders.190 If shareholders are not fully informed, 
approval by a shareholder majority cannot be granted deference under the entire fairness test.191   
Fair price, the substantive prong of the entire fairness test, takes into account appraisal 
remedy192 as well, which substitutes a traditional judicial determination of “reasonable price” for 
a privately negotiated price.193    
                                                  
185
 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
186
 Cannon & Tangney, supra note 7, at 735. 
187
 Id. at 736. 
188
 See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., Inc., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367-68 (Del. 1993). 
189
 Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). 
190
 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985). 
191
 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
192
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(h)(2003). 
193
 Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 150 A.2d 755, 758 (Del. 1959) (“The appraisal right is given to the stockholder 
in compensation for his former right at common law to prevent a merger.”); See Calabresi & Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 [HARV. L. REV.] 1089, 1092 (1972) (“The 
appraisal remedy replaces an entitlement protected by a property rule, which allows individual parties to bargain so 
as to maximize price, with an entitlement protected by a liability rule, which allows a purchaser to acquire property 
at an ‘objectively determined value’ reached by a court.). 
   - 42 - 
In Weinberger,194 the Court noted that even a price above market can reflect unfair 
discrimination against the minority stockholders because the controlling shareholders can recoup 
any per-share loss after the acquisition. As such, the controlling shareholders can structure the 
transaction so as to shift the costs disproportionately to the minority.195 In dictum, the Court 
strongly supported “two basic approaches to valuation: a comparative analysis of the premium 
paid over market in ten other tender offer-merger combinations, and a discounted cash flow 
analysis.”196 
Since the adoption of the entire fairness test in Weinberger, Delaware courts have used the 
substantive fairness prong broadly.197  The Court therefore appears to be more concerned with 
the presence of substantive fairness than procedural fairness. While the Delaware Court has 
demonstrated the importance of examining all aspects of the issue as a whole,198 both procedural 
prong of fair dealing and substantive prong of fair price will work together in the court’s 
determination of any issues regarding the entire fairness.   
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CHAPTER 5  
DIRECTORIAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE CONTROLLED 
 GOING-PRIVATE TENDER OFFER 
As mentioned at the beginning, this article addresses the directorial fiduciary duties in a 
going-private transaction by a controlling shareholder but in a voluntary context rather than in a 
coercive situation where a hostile acquisition has threatened. Therefore, the directorial duties on 
how to act to block or defeat an unfriendly bidder are not covered in this article. Instead, this 
article focuses on the directors’ duties to the minority shareholders arising from an inside tender 
offer under Delaware law.  
 
A. General Principles and Elements in a Tender Offer Context 
Under Delaware law, a tender offer made by a controlling shareholder for the minority’s 
shares shall be subject to two conditions: a non-coercive transaction and an adequate disclosure 
to the minority shareholders.199    
Non-coerciveness requires that the tender offer transaction shall not leave the shareholders 
any practical choice but to accept an offer’s term.200 A tender offer is also regarded as coercive 
where the tendering shareholders are “wrongfully induced by some act of the defendant to sell 
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their shares for reasons unrelated to the economic merits of the sale”201 if such wrongful acts 
“influence in some material way” the shareholder’s decision to tender.202   
In In re Pure Resource,203 the non-coerciveness in a tender offer is further developed as “1) 
the offer is subject to a non-waivable majority of the minority tender condition; 2) the controlling 
stockholder promises to consummate a prompt section 253 merger204 at the same price if it 
obtains more than 90% of the shares; and 3) the controlling stockholder has made no retributive 
threats.”205 
The full disclosure requirement demands that all material facts surrounding the tender offer 
shall be accurately disclosed to the minority shareholders of the target company.206 A fact is 
deemed material if there is a “substantial likelihood that its disclosure would have been viewed 
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.” 207  Nonetheless, Delaware law does not require disclosure of “all available 
information” simply because available information “might be helpful.”208 In a tender offer 
proceeding, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating materiality.209 Therefore, in a dispute 
over whether there has been full disclosure, the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a material omission or misstatement has been made “that would make a 
reasonable shareholder more likely to tender his shares.”210 
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Unlike mergers, since there are few specified codes211 to regulate tender offer,212 the related 
case law thus plays a critical role in our analysis on the fiduciary duties imposed on the directors 
in the context of a going-private tender offer launched by the controlling shareholders.     
 
B. Directorial Fiduciary Duties 
a. Recent Related Delaware Cases  
The following cases, all decided by the Delaware courts in this century, illustrate the 
particular fiduciary obligations directors face in the context of a tender offer, which are totally 
different from those in a going-private merger situation.  
 
(a) The Fiduciary Duties on Disinterested and Independent Directors — In re Siliconix, Inc., 
Shareholders Litigation213 
In Siliconix, the controlling shareholder initially announced an all-cash tender for the shares 
in its subsidiary that it did not already own, offering a ten percent premium over the subsidiary’s 
then market price per share. The subsidiary responded by forming a special committee comprised 
of two independent directors to negotiate the transaction with the controlling shareholder, and the 
special committee rejected the controlling shareholder’s initial all-cash offer.214 
In response to the rejection of its initial all-cash tender offer proposal, the controlling 
shareholder launched a stock-for-stock tender offer to the non-affiliated shareholders without 
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first seeking or obtaining the consent of the special committee. It contained a “majority of the 
minority” provision requiring a majority of those shareholders to tender their shares but also 
noted that, while the controlling shareholder intended to effect a short-form merger following a 
successful tender offer, there might be circumstances under which it would not do so.215 
The special committee made the decision to remain neutral and made no recommendation 
with respect to that tender offer. It also did not request its financial advisor to provide a fairness 
opinion with respect to the transaction, reasoning that once the process had changed from a 
negotiated transaction to a unilateral tender offer, the special committee did not need to consider 
whether the offer was fair to shareholders.216 
In the proceeding, the Siliconix court’s reasoning began with the principle that a majority 
shareholder had no obligation to offer a particular, fair price in a tender offer for minority shares, 
with the caveat that the offer could not be “coercive in some significant way.”217 The Court then 
distinguished the tender offer context from that of a merger transaction, explaining that in a 
tender offer, a shareholder had the choice of whether or not to accept the offer, and was therefore 
free to reject the offer and retain stock in the enterprise. In the merger context, the court reasoned 
that the negotiation was between the company itself and the acquirer with the shareholder given 
no direct decision-making authority.218  
The plaintiff shareholders in Siliconix argued that the board was required to take a position as 
to whether the shareholders should accept the tender offer and to inform shareholders of that 
decision and the reasons for it.219 The court rejected this argument and contrasted it with the 
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duties of the board in the context of a merger. The court explained that in McMullin v. Beran,220 
a case with facts similar to those in Siliconix but in which the transaction was executed as a 
merger, the board had an affirmative duty to protect the interests of minority shareholders by 
ascertaining the subsidiary’s value to assist shareholders in determining whether the offer was 
fair or whether to invoke their appraisal rights.221 However, in tender offer context, “a board of 
directors …traditionally has been accorded no statutory role whatsoever with respect to a public 
tender offer for even a controlling number of shares”222 because tender offers “are viewed as 
sales of individual private property and not as corporate transactions.”223 
 
(b) The Fiduciary Duties on Interested or Dependent Directors —In re Aquila, Inc., Shareholders 
Litigation224 
In re Aquila, Inc., Shareholders Litigation involved a tender offer initiated by a parent 
corporation for its subsidiary’s stock that it did not already own. The Delaware Chancery Court 
denied the shareholders’ motion since Delaware law does not impose a duty of entire fairness on 
a controlling stockholder making a non-coercive tender offer225 where the minority shareholders 
are adequately informed. The court also ruled that target company directors even appointed by 
the controlling shareholder or otherwise failing the independence test did not breach their 
fiduciary duties simply by not making recommendation with respect to the offer or failing to 
appoint the independent directors to express an opinion on the fairness.226  
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The Aquila Court reasoned that due to a real or potential conflict of interests in connection 
with the transaction, all directors of the subsidiary determined not to make a recommendation on 
the offer.227 Then the court further reasoned that the stockholders “would still have to decide for 
themselves whether to tender or not”228 and in addition, here the shareholders’ opportunity to 
decide whether or not to tender was certainly valuable.229 Therefore, the independent directors 
“could do little more than communicate their conclusion to the stockholders in the Schedule 
14d-9 and recommend that they not tender.”230 
 
(c) Development in the Fiduciary Duties Applied in the Tender Offer Context — In re Pure 
Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation231 
The court in Pure Resources determined that the offer initiated by the controlling shareholder 
should be enjoined primarily because it determined the offer to be “coercive” and because 
“material information relevant to the stockholders’ decision-making process had not been fairly 
disclosed.”232 In Pure Resources, the controlling shareholder initiated an offer to acquire the 
shares in its subsidiary that it did not already own in an exchange offer. The target company 
responded to the proposed exchange offer by forming a special committee of directors to 
consider the offer and to negotiate with the controlling shareholder. This special committee was 
comprised of independent directors, but the larger board still with members appointed by the 
controlling shareholder, refused to increase the authority of the special committee beyond its 
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delegated authority to retain independent advisors, take a position on behalf of the target 
company with respect to the offer, and negotiate with the controlling shareholder.233 
Then, the special committee performed its core functions of hiring outside legal counsel and 
financial advisors and evaluating the transaction.234 After the counter-offers made by the special 
committee were rejected by the controlling shareholder,235 the special committee made a 
not-to-tender recommendation to the shareholders.236 However, the state court thereafter found 
that the directors failed to include all of the details regarding the financial advice they relied 
upon in recommending shareholders to reject the offer.237  
In dictum, the Court in Pure Resources, through a discussion on Delaware precedent cases 
including Siliconix and Aquila, again addressed such issues as the different treatments to a 
controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duties in the negotiated merger and the tender offer context. It 
noted that the emphasis on protecting shareholders from unfairness in merger transactions while 
permitting tender offers to proceed without a fairness inquiry, so long as coercion or 
misinformation was not employed, represented the “incoherence in our law.”238 The court found 
it inconsistent that a controlling shareholder would have no duty to pay a fair price for minority 
shares in the context of a tender offer, simply owing to the form of transaction utilized, and yet 
had the burden of showing the entire fairness of the transaction if the same minority shares were 
acquired through a negotiated merger transaction.239  
Finally, the Chancery Court concluded that the fiduciary requirement of showing entire 
fairness should not be imposed on a controlling shareholder launching a tender offer for minority 
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shares, but only so long as the offer was not coercive pursuant to the three-pronged test.240 The 
Pure Resources offer failed this test and was thus determined to be defective.241 In addition, the 
court determined that the disclosures made by the special committee were insufficient because 
they did not provide sufficient detail with respect to valuation advice received from the 
company’s financial advisors.242 However, finally the court imposed no specific requirements 
for the board, or even the special committee, to recommend for or against a tender offer. 
 
c. Summary for the Directorial Fiduciary Duties in Tender Offers 
From the analysis of these cases, we may follow the trail of Delaware courts to delineate the 
current fiduciary duties that the directors face in the context of a going-private tender offer led by 
a controlling party.  
From Siliconix243 and Aquila,244  the court imposed no liability on both directors, the 
interested and disinterested, either for their neutral status in making no recommendation whether 
to tender into the offer to the minority shareholders or for their failure to consult with a financial 
professional. Those cases suggest that the Delaware courts leave great room to the shareholders 
to decide by themselves in that “individual private property sale.”245  The directors, as the third 
party to such a sale, seemingly are not obligated to do anything. However, in Pure Resources,246 
the court not only refined the distinction between mergers and tender offers recognized in Aquila 
and in Siliconix, proposing specific guidelines that tender offers initiated by controlling 
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shareholders must meet in order to avoid an entire fairness review247 but also explicitly specified 
that by no means obvious that simply because a controlling stockholder proceeds by way of a 
tender offer that the target’s directors fell outside the constraints of fiduciary duty law.248 
Nonetheless, though the Pure Resources court defined that the directors’ duties were not satisfied 
where they simply blindly (or without giving justification) recommended against an acquisition 
bid,249 it failed to further establish the specific standards of conduct for directors with respect to 
recommending the fairness of a particular offer to the minority shareholders.250  
In the context of the going-private tender offers, the controlling shareholders directly make 
an offer to the public shareholders of the company to tender their shares. Under those 
circumstances, if the directors did not need to make any recommendations to the minority 
shareholders as to how to vote on a tender offer, the directors would almost perform no other 
significant obligations to the minority shareholders. Thus, the failure to establish a specific 
standard regarding directors’ liability to make a recommendation in the context of the 
going-private tender offer almost amounts to leaving open the issue of directorial fiduciary duties 
in a tender offer. Therefore, there seemingly are no clear duties or standards of review imposed 
on the directors in the context of tender offers as those in a merger situation under the current 
Delaware law. To some degree, however, it seems that Pure Resources predicts the Delaware 
courts’ trend to establish the specific conduct standards for the directors in the tender offer 
context as it has done in a merger situation. Maybe in the near future, there will emerge a 
specified fiduciary duty system, especially respecting the tender offer contexts in Delaware. 
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CHAPTER 6  
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DIRECTORIAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN  
MERGERS VS. TENDER OFFERS 
A. Inconsistency of Directorial Duties between Mergers and Tender Offers 
As noted above, the directorial fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders in the context of 
a controlled going-private transaction are distinguishable from the duties owed by the 
disinterested or independent directors and those interested or controlled by the dominating 
shareholders. In a merger context, the disinterested and independent directors only bear a duty of 
care, and the applied standard of review shall be the business judgment rule.251 While for those 
controlled or interested directors, they shall bear a duty of loyalty to the minority shareholders, 
and the only way for them to discharge all of their fiduciary obligations is to prove an entire 
fairness in that transaction.252  
In contrast, in a tender offer case, the current Delaware statutory and case law do not imbue 
directors with a responsibility to assist shareholders in evaluating the fairness of those unilateral 
tender offers. Therefore, though the most recent case253 does not fully deny fiduciary duties on 
the directors only because of a controlling stockholder proceeds by way of a tender offer, the 
court still fails to establish specified standards of conduct for directors with respect to 
recommending the fairness of a particular offer to minority shareholders254 and fails to identify 
explicitly the standard fiduciary duties the directors face and the related standards of review 
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applied in such a context. Therefore, compared the different fiduciary duties borne by the 
directors in the context of mergers versus tender offer, it is undisputable that the courts focus 
their attention more on that directorial fiduciary duty issue in the context of mergers than that in 
the tender offers.  
The reasons for such a great distinction, as noted above, are multiple. On a statutory level, 
the corporation law statutes were basically designed in a period when large scale public tender 
offers were rarities.255 On a more conceptual level, tender offers essentially represent the sale of 
shareholders’ separate property, and such sales—even when aggregated into a single change in 
control transaction—require no “corporate” action and do not involve distinctively “corporate” 
interests. 256  In addition, the tender offer is rarely regarded as an important or special 
circumstance where the directors shall bear the fiduciary duties directly to the shareholders.257  
Therefore, on the traditional aspect of the case law, the Court regards that the free choice of the 
minority shareholders to reject the tender offer provides sufficient protection258 already, and the 
directors can do little more than communicate their recommendation to the stockholders,259 
which still leaves the shareholders themselves to make a final decision whether to tender or not.      
Nonetheless, how to protect the minority shareholder interests in an unfairly priced unilateral 
tender offer, with the board’s inaction on one hand but the controlling acquirer’s domination and 
informational advantages on the other hand, shall raise more concerns and attentions from the 
public. 
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B. The Proposal and the Related Reasons 
a. The Proposal  
Through a comparison between directorial fiduciary duties in the controlled going-private 
transactions structured as mergers versus tender offers, we may find a feeble and vague fiduciary 
duty system applied in the tender offer context under current Delaware laws. In order to better 
protect the minority shareholders’ interests in the context of controlling party initiated tender 
offers, this article proposes Delaware courts to establish an affirmative obligation to the directors 
to assist shareholders in evaluating the fairness of those tender offers as soon as possible and to 
apply the same levels of fiduciary duties and standards of review on the directors as those 
applied in the merger context.   
    
b. The Related Grounds for that Proposal  
In effect, the minority shareholders require more protection in the context of tender offers 
than in the mergers, but the directors have been accorded no statutory role under such a 
circumstance. Therefore, in order to well protect the minority shareholders’ interests, the 
aforesaid proposal, based on the following grounds, is both necessary and rational. 
  
(a)  The Controlling Shareholders’ Preference to the Tender Offers 
 Most tender offer transactions may practically seek the same ultimate result to eliminate the 
minority shareholders as a negotiated merger transaction through a short-form merger,260 if the 
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controlling shareholder may own at least ninety percent of the target company stock following 
the close of the tender offer.  
However, applying such a short-form merger through a means of the tender offer, the 
controlling shareholders, upon satisfying the requirement of full disclosure and non-coerciveness, 
generally need not be subject to an entire fairness review,261 which shall be applied in the 
identical transaction but structured by mergers even with the operation of the special committee 
of the fully disinterested and independent directors. Besides, under Delaware laws, absent fraud 
or illegality, appraisal is the exclusive remedy available to a minority shareholder who objects to 
a short-form merger, 262  but in mergers, minority shareholders are also entitled to other 
remedies.263  
Although a tender for all shares likely followed by a short-form merger may be viewed in 
substance as one overall merger effort, the Delaware courts still have declined that invitation on 
two reasons—first, because Delaware law has recognized the tender followed by the short-form 
merger as separate events, and second, because there is no guarantee of any acquirer to complete 
the backend merger.264 The courts’ general attitudes as well as the statutorily defined simplified 
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procedures265 to the tender offers and short-form mergers may encourage those reasonable 
controlling shareholders to increase the use of such two-step mergers.266     
 
(b) Needs for More Protection to Minority Shareholders in Tender Offers  
Traditionally, in the context of tender offer, shareholders of Delaware corporations are 
free to accept or reject the tender based on their own evaluation of their best interests,267 but 
most shareholders do not have the resources available to make a reasonable determination of the 
value of such an opportunity since they will not have their own investment bank.268 Without the 
assistance from directors to retain the financial consultant, it is hard for the general individual 
shareholder to decide whether the offer is fairly priced. 
 Besides the evaluation disadvantage, the shareholders also face other problems. In Pure 
Resources,269 the court discussed that given the nature of transactions structured as tender offers, 
these forms of acquisitions were “arguably less protective than a merger” of shareholder 
interests,270 particularly considering that a shareholder that failed to sell into a tender offer faced 
an uncertain future.271 Except for such an uncertain future, the minority shareholders in the 
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context of a controlling shareholder launched tender offer even face more disadvantages than 
those in a hostile tender offer initiated by the third party.272 Since in the latter, the unfriendly 
third party likely will be faced with defensive measures implemented by the incumbent board, 
whereas in the former case, the tender offer will be treated as a matter between that controlling 
shareholder and the minority shareholders and thus will be unburdened even by the requirement 
that the offer be fairly priced.273 It shall be further noted that the more controlling and 
informational advantages enjoyed by that controlling shareholders in the tender offers alone are 
adequately significant to the detriment to those minority shareholders.274  
  
(c) Impacts of the Federal Statute on the Minority Shareholders’ Protection  
 Though this article discusses only the fiduciary duties arising from the going-private 
transactions under Delaware law, the negative impact of some federal statutes on the individual 
shareholders may also arouse an urgency to provide more protection to those minority 
shareholders from the state-level. With the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995,275 which seeks to combat perceived abuses in securities class action litigation,276 it 
is more difficult for individual shareholders to file a suit to protect their own interests under the 
federal laws. Therefore, the need to give more protection from the state laws to the shareholders 
is more significant than before. Fiduciary duties, a traditional area of state laws shall perform its 
functions well to reduce the possibility that directors or majority shareholders will favor personal 
benefits over the corporation’s or the minority shareholders’ interests.  
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 In the context of a controlling shareholder launched tender offer, under current Delaware 
law, the minority shareholders can not either have an entirely fair transaction as assured in a 
merger or legally require the directors to make a recommendation of a fairness which is well 
conducted in mergers and in a coercive tender offer initiated by a third party. Further, with an 
increased difficulty to file a private litigation under federal laws, the minority shareholders in a 
controlled going-private tender offer need more protection from the directors, from the state 
courts and from the state statutes. 
  
c. How to Realize that Proposal 
In order to couple those unilateral tender offers with the requirement that the directors must 
have an affirmative obligation to assist shareholders in evaluating the fairness of those offers, the 
Delaware courts must first reject the distinction made in Siliconix and Aquila between mergers 
and tender offers and recognize the heightened standard applied in Pure Resources to 
controlling-party led tender offers. The Delaware courts may further require the directors under 
such circumstances to form an independent committee to evaluate the offer in much the same 
way they do in a merger context.  That special committee should be not only empowered with 
the authority to retain independent advisors, take a position on behalf of the target company with 
respect to the offer, and negotiate with the controlling shareholder but also authorized to take an 
affirmative position either for or against the tender offer, issue its opinion on behalf of the full 
board of directors and provide shareholders with a full record of their deliberations and the 
advice relied upon by the board.277 Those rights to empower the directors to “say no”278 to those 
offers that are unfair will call for more attention and further consideration of general 
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shareholders to decide whether to tender their shares. It may also announce to those 
non-tendering individual shareholders that they are not alone since the board is behind them. 
Even for those non-tendering shareholders as part of a less-than-ten-percent minority, such 
“to-say-no” power will help eliminate their worries of receiving a diminished value in a 
short-term transaction, since the financial record the board relied on will help them to smooth 
their pursuit for the appraisal rights. Besides, to require the board to offer shareholders with a full 
record of their deliberations and the advice may better satisfied with the “full disclosure”279 
requirement as well as leave the raw financial data to the investors and thus subjected it to a 
public debate.  
The fiduciary duties imposed on the directors in the evaluation of the fairness of the offer in 
the context of a controlling-party-led tender offer shall be according to the same standards to 
which the directors would be subjected in the merger context since that fiduciary duty system is 
well developed from Delaware’s precedent in the merger contexts. In addition, to follow the 
same fiduciary duty system may also well solve the “inconsistency” 280 of law in the context of 
the tender offers versus mergers. Therefore, in the tender offer contexts, those interested and 
dependent shareholders shall also bear the duty of loyalty, which will be subject to entire fairness 
review, and those disinterested and independent shareholders shall take the duties of care and be 
protected by the business judgment rule.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The Delaware court’s decision in Pure Resources281 that the controlling-party tender offers 
must meet that three-prong test282 of non-coerciveness or else face an entire fairness review 
signifies the trend in the law toward providing shareholders with increased protection. It may be 
predicted that in the near future, it will be possible for Delaware courts to establish some 
specified standards with respect to the directors’ obligation in evaluation of fairness in a tender 
offer led by the controlling shareholder to those minority shareholders.  
The directorial fiduciary duty system with respect to the protection towards shareholders in 
the context of the going-private transactions under current Delaware law structure, though with 
some defects, still confers a bulk of good ideas to the Chinese corporate law field in how to 
establish and develop its own fiduciary duty system in the future.  
Though in China, at present the fiduciary duties are not well enumerated, with the increase 
in the employment of the going-private transactions structured either by mergers or by tender 
offers, the stronger needs to protect the interests of those minority shareholders will push our 
own fiduciary duty system to emerge, to develop, and to work well as soon as possible.           
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